Articles. Liberty. Ideas.
Animals Rights from a Natural Law perspective
Animal rights from a praxeological perspective.
Natural Law theorists have argued that animals are not right-holders, but little thought (from a praxeological perspective) has been put into this position. Praxeology(1) derives from the claim that man acts (although instead of man I’ll use the word individual), everything else is supposed to follow this axiom.
Praxeology states that an individual deliberately act based on purpose. His actions may be influenced by natural or social factors but ultimately he, the individual, is able to choose whether to do or not do something.
His actions might look “irrational” or not ideal (such as stop eating food or lean towards keynesianism) but in a praxeological sense an individual is purposefully acting. As Mises, Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe have shown (2) the beauty of Praxeology (and logic itself) consists in the logical framework of congruent statements (in regards to an axiom). Nonetheless, even if I agree with most of the later author’s theories, I also happen to disagree with some conclusions, such as Animal rights.
Starting from scratch, we’ll say that the existence of statements implies the existence of true and false statements (otherwise we would be contradicting ourselves). Additionally, we can add (as an axiom) that true or false statements exist even if we aren’t able to see or experience them (we might not be there to experience the fall of leaves, but whether we see it or not, the event can take place). Thus, true statements exist even if we weren’t able to explain or argue about them because of our limited abilities or circumstances (such as people never thinking about the non aggression principle just because they weren’t taught this in school). If we apply this rule to reason itself, it becomes clear that if we didn’t have enough intelligence or the cognitive capacity to argue about something, we would just be deprived of the means to know the validity of complex statements (3). Nonetheless, in regards to natural law, Rothbard denied this conclusion. Let’s issue his claims one by one;
“In short, man has rights because they are natural rights. They are grounded in the nature of man: the individual man's capacity for conscious choice, the necessity for him to use his mind and energy to adopt goals and values, to find out about the world, to pursue his ends in order to survive and prosper, his capacity and need to communicate and interact with other human beings and to participate in the division of labor. In short, man is a rational and social animal.”
If we have read the Ethics of Liberty we know that Natural Law Theory is rooted on logical claims, not in the empirical observation of behaviors, thus, for now we’ll take man’s capacity for conscious choice as an axiom. But what does it actually mean? Mises, for example, writes in Human action that
"Action is will put into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life."
But how do we know when someone is consciously adjusting to the state of the universe? (4) Rothbard states that
“Human Action, on the other hand, can be meaningfully interpreted by other men, for it is governed by a certain purpose that the actor has in view. The purpose is a man’s motive for instituting the action.”
But still, the question that arises from Rothbard’s assumption is; How could we know if an action has a certain purpose (which the actor had in view)? As Mises has carefully explained (5), as external judges, there is no way to know. Praxeologically speaking an individual is acting, even if we think they are being “irrational” or being influenced by biological factors. If this is true, which kind of individuals or living beings should be included in this action category? How and where do we draw the line between animal’s and human conscious choices? The popular answer, not explicitly expressed in the author’s book, is based on the fact that animals are not as smart as humans and do not communicate with us (which seems likes a weak subjective -nonpraxeological- answer). For example, later on Rothbard states that
“The fact that animals can obviously not petition for their "rights" is part of their nature, and part of the reason why they are clearly not equivalent to, and do not possess the rights of, human beings.”
Nonetheless, why would we set the threshold of “purposeful action” to an action followed by an explanation in a determined language or media?(6) One may argue two things: that a) it is not the explanation by itself but the logical and biological implications of our abilities that gives humans as a specie the acknowledgment of rights or that b) since that is the only way to know one hundred percent when an action is purposeful or not, that should be the threshold to having rights. Regarding a, the developed answer to our question would look something like this: It is the individual’s or specie’s ability of talking, and as a consequence cooperate with each other, the threshold to rights, since individuals must be able to solve disputes (differences in scale values) without violence. But what if the individual(7) is able to solve disputes without talking? It seems clear that the alleged threshold should be the ability to negotiate, not just communicating that a purposeful action is taking place. However, any dispute has to have two disagreeing parts (besides the ability to negotiate) where both just want their needs(8) met, whatever those needs are. Cherry-picking a side in animal-human disputes just because we have more empathy towards someone (in a dispute between a bird being kicked out of his nest because of a construction and the real estate agent we would probably have more empathy towards the agent) is not praxeological at all. But even more importantly, both axioms mentioned (individual acts and true statements exist even if we aren’t able to express or “fully” understand them) contradict the settlement of “purposeful action” to an action followed by an explanation in a determined language as the threshold for consciousness.
Besides the latter explanation, to many readers affirmation b could sound reasonable. After all, how else could two living beings respect their private property if not by understanding each other? This question is tricky because it presupposes the existence of private property and is a utilitarian question, not a praxeological one. The difficulty to respect other’s private property does not invalidate Natural Law. The fact that governments are hard to wipe out of existence given the status quo of public opinion doesn’t mean that Natural Law approves their existence or that it is ethical to steal-kill with an intermediary. In other words, the ability to speak or communicate should not represent the threshold to decide who is “allowed” to have or be considered private property. If we were to deny this we should at least be honest and formulate the claim properly: “Logically, every living being is owner of his own body and property. Nonetheless, I consider the cost of respecting property’s right too high. That’s the reason I’ll only respect the property of those who are able to speak or communicate in the same media as me”.
Let’s continue with Rothbard’s arguments;
“No other anir or beings posses this ability to reason, to make conscious choices, to transform their environment in order to prosper, or to collaborate consciously in society and the division of labor. Thus, while natural rights, as we have been emphasizing, are absolute, there is one sense in which they are relative: they are relative to the species. A rights-ethic for mankind is precisely that: for all men, regardless man of race, creed, color or sex, but for the species man alone.”
Rothbard’s conclusion seems to be that since other living beings don’t have the degree of cognitive capabilities or time preference that humans do, they do not qualify as right-holders. It must be noted that between humans and other living beings, the cognitive difference is a degree-kind and not a type-kind, contrary to what Rothbard seems to emphasize. I believe it is arbitrary to say that other living beings don’t reason at all just because they are not as smart as humans. As we have seen before, it is arbitrary to say that other living beings (or humans) don’t make conscious choices. It is arbitrary to say that other living beings don’t transform the environment in order to prosper just because they don’t transform the environment as much as humans (birds and ants modify the environment to create nests). It is arbitrary to say that no other living being consciously collaborate in “society” (defining society as human society) and the division of labor.
It is well-known that many animals collaborate with each other in order to survive or live better (9). Either Rothbard totally ignores this fact or the claim is deliberately based on relative affirmations; they do not collaborate in the division of labor (or knowledge) as much as mankind.
But even if Rothbard’s affirmations were true, again; those claims would not invalidate praxeological claims or the absoluteness of natural law theory. Later on, Rothbard tries to explain his position through the “Martian problem”
“Any concept of rights, of criminality, of aggression, can only apply to actions of one man or group of men against other human beings. What of the "Martian" problem? If we should ever discover and make contact with beings from other planets, could they be said to have the rights of human beings? lt would depend on their nature. If our hypothetical "Martians" were like human beings-conscious, rational, able to communicate with us and participate in the division of labor, then presumably they too would possess the rights now confined to "earthbound" humans. But suppose, on the other hand, that the Martian also had the characteristics, the nature, of the legendary vampire, and could only exist by feeding on human blood. In that case, regardless of their intelligence, the Martians would be our deadly enemy and we could not consider that they were entitled to the rights of humanity. Deadly enemy, again, not because they were wicked aggressors, but because of the needs and requirements of their nature, which would clash ineluctably with ours.”
We have already seen how the affirmation made by Rothbard based on a specie “nature” is nothing more than an empirical (positivist) utilitarian claim. According to utilitarian claims we are better off cooperating and trading based on the division of knowledge-labor, but praxeologically speaking, this is not true at all (10). Additionally, Rothbard’s definition of “nature” is based on results; he classifies “natural actions” as those choices proven to increase man’s quality of life and life expectancy (as Mises used to do);
“An apple, let fall, will drop to the ground; this we all observe and acknowledge to be in the nature of the apple (as well as the world in general). Two atoms of hydrogen combined with one of oxygen will yield one molecule of water-behavior that is uniquely in the nature of hydrogen, oxygen, and water. (…) Since the world does not consist of one homogeneous thing or entity alone, it follows that each one of these different things possesses differing attributes, otherwise they would all be the same thing. But if A, B, C, etc., have different attributes, it follows immediately that they have different natures.
lt also follows that when these various things meet and interact, a specifically delimitable and definable result will occur. In short, specific, delimitable causes will have specific, delimitable effects.”
Although the latter affirmations are true, Rothbard is talking about inanimate objects. He is using as examples things that do not have a “mind” or “will”. Human’s nature, as well as apple’s nature, should be defined by natural sciences using reason. The fall of an apple is in “it’s nature” because that characteristic is embedded in his biological or physical existence. Apple’s are not able to “not fall” if they want to. That’s why that characteristic is considered to be Apple’s nature. If a man desires to be a woman, we can say that he is going against nature because all he can do is act and dress like one. Nonetheless, biologically speaking, he will still be a man. However, as we have said before, Rothbard has a utilitarian view on Natural Law, this fact becomes clear when he states that
“The natural law ethic decrees that for all living things, "goodness"is the fulfillment of what is best for that type of creature; "goodness" is therefore relative to the nature of the creature concerned.
I believe this claim is totally false. If Natural Law Ethics decrees such a thing, then who defines what is best for any given type of creature? (wasn’t ethics and logic supposed to be free of judgment values?) (11) It would seem like each individual creature defines what is best for their specie based on their utilitarian estimations, for example, Rothbard seems to consider that humans must engage in trade and not violence because both parties always benefit through voluntary interactions. Nonetheless, in mankind there are certainly “dumb people” which aren’t necessarily beneficial from an economic perspective. Even if we considered Ricardian Law of comparative advantage, there would still be people that, if we were to trade with them, we would end up worse according to our scale values (12). The claim that we always benefit from trade is, I believe, wrong. Someone may object that since, apriori, every interpersonal and interpersonal voluntary exchange is beneficial, voluntary trade is always good. This claim is straight up incorrect because it implies a definition of voluntary. Nonetheless, in order to establish what voluntary means, we first need to establish what private property is and if all living beings are right-holders (otherwise we could say that we are engaging in a voluntary transaction killing a mentally disabled person or another living being not considered as conscious or human). This is why trade and cooperation are not thresholds to be considered in Natural Law theory.
So, what about the Martian problem? Well, the human race and the chimpanzee have a genetic similarity of 99%, nonetheless, the intellectual disparity is colossal, in relative terms. Now imagine that our “Martian friends” have the same genetic similarity (99%) but the intellectual disparity is in favor of the other specie (the human race being stupider and having less temporal preference). Now let’s imagine that this genetic and intellectual disparity makes our Martian friends capable of telepathic communication (or just in another, more complex, language). Does the fact that we do not share the same means of communication makes ending with the human race by the Martians “legitimate”? Couldn’t our loved friends say that human beings act based on mere instincts? Where is the consciousness threshold? Based on the concept of action it is clear that there is no such line, and that every living being ultimately owns itself by the simple fact of acting or existing. It can be said, correctly, that other living beings act in a way that is more focused on the present. It can be said, correctly, that other living beings have a low intellectual capacity compared to humans. But I don’t see how, logically speaking, these affirmations deprive property right’s from these living beings.
However, Rothbard claims that
“We do not judge elephants to be good because they are natural; or because nature is morally good-whatever that would mean. We judge a particular elephant to be good by the light of what elephant nature makes it possible for elephants to do and to be. In the case of man, the natural-law ethic states that goodness or badness can be determined by what fulfills or thwarts what is best for man's nature.”
Although I agree with Rothbard’s sense of empathy regarding judging elephants depending on what they are capable of doing, I’d like to separate (so we don’t overlap) two concepts; Ethical and Moral comprehension.
If a robber steals from a Bank, we could get 3 different kind of reactions; a) Ethical Reprehension; b) Ethical Reprehension but Moral Comprehension and c) Moral Comprehension.
a) Reaction would be adopted by Natural Law purists; if the robber committed a crime, it doesn’t matter if it was because he needed the money. It doesn’t matter if they lived their childhood learning that stealing was desirable. It doesn’t matter if they didn’t have parents. They committed the crime, and they must pay for it.
b) Reaction would be adopted by, let’s say, Christians. They know the act is Ethical unjustifiable (thus, the robber should indemnify the victim) but they understand where those people came from and would be oriented to help instead of punishing them.
c) Reaction would be adopted by Socialists and, in this case, Rothbard (I know it’s a bold statement, but let me explain myself). From left-wing psychologists and neuroscientists to 99% of sociologists; they all would agree that it wasn’t fault of the robber. He was “coerced” by society, his environment and his nature (of surviving). Thus, since he isn’t responsible for his actions, he shouldn’t be responsible for the indemnizations. This seems to be the posture Rothbard would logically adopt based on his statements (or Cropsey’s statements, which he seems to agree with). Since Animals are not responsible for their actions, then they shouldn’t be held responsible for what they do.
Lastly, one may argue that human capabilities let him not commit so called crimes while animal’s capabilities do not. However, we assume that the robber is held responsible because we see humans act in both ways; however, this ignores the role of the environment and the mind or soul. The fact is that we don’t know how much environment affects in our personal decisions. We have no way of knowing if an alleged actor is, so to speak, guilty (based on instincts, environment or free will), but praxeologically speaking, the individual acts. So why is Rothbard assuming that elephants, cocodriles and other animals are not to be held responsible if they kill a human or threaten someone? (13)
Questions regarding animals rights
Let’s answer some questions that may arise regarding the application of law in a libertarian society (focusing on animal rights).
If every living being owns itself, wouldn’t this mean that they would also be able to acquire property?
A priori: yes, the acquisition of property rights (assets) is possible. However, it is vitally important to remember that the possibility of organisms (individuals) to respect other’s individuals property may vary depending on the degree of technological advancement and economic growth or wealth, as well as the degree of peaceful and meaningful communication between individuals (whether humans or animals). Natural law establishes that the right to private property must be respected, but it’s applicability is dependent on external factors that progressively, thanks to the recognition of the importance of property rights, develop, to the point where it is defended almost perfectly. Let’s take an example.
Sophia sees an apple tree in the woods and picks one of its fruits, thinking it’s no one’s property. Later on, she realizes that this tree belonged to Juan. After a few minutes, Juan gets to know what happened, so he proceeds to ask Sophia for a “sorry” as compensation.
In order to protect property rights in this situation three sparks of information are needed;
1.- The first spark of information was transmitted when Sophia saw the apple tree and made an entrepreneurial decision to carry out the aforementioned action. Sophia, consciously or unconsciously, made an estimation of how likely it was that the three was someone’s property. But not only she took into account how likely it was that the apple three or the apple itself was owned, she had to guess what exactly was owned by Juan. Maybe he (Juan) only considers apples as scarce, because that’s what he primarily wants, so the three does not matter for him as long as it is not hindered. But maybe Juan just consider as scarce his tree, for spiritual reasons. Thus, Sofia had to considered which option she believed was the correct one based on social, biological and economic factors. Social factors such as what is the trend among individuals? Do the majority of people own or use both things (apples and trees)? Economic factors such as what direct or indirect marginal use could that apple have? Ultimately, all these considerations lead to the same question; What does the subject of law consider scarce or his property?
2.- The second spark is transmitted when Juan realizes that Sophia took the apple. If Juan did not find out, such theft could go unnoticed and property rights would not be properly defended, since it wouldn’t be known that this act took place. (14)
3.- The third and last spark is transmitted when Juan externalizes the indemnification he wants and the receiver internalizes it (doing the action).
It is extremely important to note the fact that if any of these three pieces of information weren’t created or transmitted, it wouldn’t mean that property rights shouldn’t be respected. If Sofia didn’t act propitiously, that is, taking property rights into account, the act of having taken the apple would still be considered theft (15). If, on the other hand, Juan hadn’t noticed his property rights were being violated, this would not mean that the theft Sofia carried out was justifiable. And ultimately, if Juan (for legislative reasons) hadn’t obtained the compensation he wanted this would not mean that rights should not be respected. The absence of any of these three conditions would only mean that property rights are not correctly protected, being this a consequence of legislative, technological, social or economic factors. Now, moving to the issue of Animal rights:
Then how do we know what is owned by whom?
Well, it seems clear by logic and nature that every living being is owner of himself. In regards to land or goods of individuals incapable of expressing the ownership to human beings, one has to wonder what a living being considers scarce and what it has originally appropriated based on its natural or “social” patterns. If there is a bird that lives in a tree, we know that he will consider the part where he lives as its property (for what it represents: a home to live in), but not necessarily the entire structure. Acting propitiously, human beings can coexist more or less in a peaceful way with other living beings; maybe they could build a house where the tree is while still giving the bird a place to live (like an outdoor space to relocate his nest). The point I’m trying to make is that we should focus on solutions rather than in attempting to justify violence towards other species in the name superior intellectual capabilities. What I’m asking here is to use the intellectual advantage we have and use it in a respectful, peaceful (as much as possible) and praxeological congruent manner.
What about animals that do not respect our property?
Although the most common answer would be to apply the right to self-defense, I do not think such thing as a “right to self-defense” exist. The premise around such right is based on utilitarian claims, praxeologically speaking there seems to be no justifiable logic where a self-defense action is part of natural law (16). This doesn’t necessarily mean you shouldn’t defend yourself against a cocodrile, robber or against the State, it only means that defending yourself (as any other action including violence) is a utilitarian action. The response to an attack, whether animal or human, will be subject to the balance between ethical and utilitarian values.
What about extinction?
Natural law is neutral in regards to the extinction of species. Even though a human being would violate natural law by killing an animal, he doesn’t if he eliminates the conditions that allow the animal to live. If, for example, a street dog happens to live in a community where everyone allows him to stay but no one feeds him, a death from famine may be a criticizable position from a moral point of view, but this will not represent a violation of natural law theory.
Can we “appropiate” an animal to pet it and make it our life partner without violating Natural Law?
We have already seen that logically (or naturally) every living being is owner of itself, which means that our conclusion indicates that appropiating other beings who are conscious is contrary to natural law. However, we should be able to take care or have (voluntarily) another living being as a friend.
How would people who kill ants and cockroaches be punished (or rather, how would the victims be compensated)?
As seen before, for a complete defense of property rights, sparks of information are needed, in this case in the compensation process. For this reason there cannot be a precise answer, nonetheless, what mankind can do is try to compensate, based on his estimations, the affected animal. The situation is even more complicated when we talk about tiny animals, because (often) we kill them without noticing. In those cases, what could we do about it? The most logical answer seems to be: act. In the same way that historically human beings appropriated unknown land, human beings must act considering the possibility of, unfortunately, killing other animals. How careful a person should be while walking is a question that will have to be considered by each individual. Ultimately, natural law tells us what behaviors humans should follow based on the laws of logic or nature, but the compliance part is subject to every organism or community. However, given the apparent impossibility of communication between humans and tiny organisms, it is humans who will have preference in the conflict resolution with respect to natural law.
In summary and contradicting Rothbard and Hoppe, I believe natural law does not establish just the human race as self-owners, but every living being. That being said, I am aware that this conclusion will clash with many libertarians, not to mention the meat lovers who see the animalists as a left group. However, I believe natural law provides a coherent basis for the defense of animal rights, which has the potential to be adopted by animalists not blinded by cultural marxism (just as “Free market ecologism” by ecologists).
Footnotes
(1) ”Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical, science. Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts. Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case. It aims at knowledge valid for all instances in which the conditions exactly correspond to those implied in its assumptions and inferences. Its statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, apriori. They are not subject to verification or falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts. They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events.” Ludwig V. Mises, Human Action: A treatise on economics, Mises Institute, 1998, pp. 32.
(2) Mises demonstrates the scope of Praxeology in Human Action, Rothbard explains through logic his view on Natural Law Theory in The Ethics of Liberty and Hoppe, through his Ethical Argumentation written in The Ethics and Economics of Private Property, further develops ethics and logic.
(3) The use of the word complex is relative in regards to someone who is not able to know the validity of any given statement.
(4) Mises’ answer is clear but confusing at the same time; he presupposed that men acted because he, as a man himself, was acting. Thus, everyone else were actors too.
(5) Ludwig V. Mises, Human Action: A treatise on economics, Mises Institute, 1998, pp. 11-29. Even though Mises argues that someone without all our cognitive functions or with animal instincts isn’t really acting probably because there’s a perceived lack of causal relation or degree of stimuli (a lot of unanswered questions arise, especially regarding to a degree-kind difference in those aspects), I will ask the reader to understand his position and extend this principle to all humans.
(6) Many people hold the belief that there ought to be a different law for each specie because they have different abilities and natures, I won’t go into details here on what’s my opinion on this matter but -before developing more in the later pages- I’ll just state those beliefs do not affect the term action and, as a consequence, the praxeological implications.
(7) I’m referring here to a praxeological individual, which is a living being (whether human or not) able to develop, reproduce and die. I must recognize that this is a poor definition, since human knowledge does not allow us (hopefully yet) to decide what’s mechanistic (or without soul-spirit) and what’s not. However, against the claim made by sociologists, neurologists and deterministic thinkers, Mises argued that it was the duality or the existence of a body and soul (or as Hayek put it; “a superior order”) the reason we purposefully acted.
(8) The word needs here has to be understood as portrayed in “Nonviolent communication: a language of life” or as “desires”.
(9)“Attempts to explain organisms in terms of their chemical constituents are rather like trying to understand a computer by grinding it up and analyzing its component elements, such as copper, germanium and silicon. Certainly it is possible to learn something about the computer in this way, namely what is made of. But in this process of reduction, the structure and the programmed activity of the computer vanishes, and chemical analysis will never reveal the circuit diagrams; no amount of mathematical modeling of interactions between its atomic constituents will reveal the computer’s programs or the purposes they fulfilled (…) To many people, especially gardeners and people who keep dogs, cats, horses or other animals, it is blindingly obvious that plants and animals are living organisms, not machines (...) The philosophy of organism in effect treats all nature as alive; in this respect it is an updated version of pre-mechanistic animism. Even atoms, molecules and crystals are organisms. (..) In Whitehead’s words, “Biology is the study of the larger organisms, whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms.”” Rupert Sheldrake, The Science Delusion: Freeing the Spirit of Enquiry, Coronet, 2012, pp. 45-49
(10) What if someone values more being “self-sufficient” than trading and being economically better off? What about those who hate people with economic progress? Do they have a different nature? It should be clear that everyone has a different scale value, and as a consequence, claiming that everyone benefits from trade is not praxeological, but utilitarian.
(11) Although I like Rothbard’s approach to commonwealth, it has no praxeological value.
(12) As Mises put it;
“If A is in such a way more efficient than B that he needs for the production of r unit of the commodity p 3 hours compared with B's 5, and for the production of I unit of q 2 hours compared with B's 4, then both will gain if A confines himself to producing q and leaves B to produce p. If each of them gives 60 hours to producing p and 60 hours to producing q, the result of A's labor is 20 p + 30 q; of B7s, I 2 p + I 5 q; and for both together, 32 p + 45 q. If, however, A confines himself to producing q alone, he produces 60 q in 120 hours, while B, if he confines himself to producing p, produces in the same time 24 p. The result of their activities is then 24 p + 60 q, which, asp 5 has for A a substitution ratio of 3 q and for B one of -q, signifies a 2 4 larger output than 32 p + 45 q. Therefore it manifest that the division of labor brings advantages to all who take part in it.” Nonetheless, this is true as far as a) B only relies on economical or financial values, b) as far as the production of A is higher than the opportunity cost found in the market, c) as far as the marginal productivity of A is higher enough to make a living and d) as far as the marginal productivity of A isn’t counterproductive.
Regarding a); if A values more “autonomy” or working by itself than engaging in trade, both parties would not benefit in the praxeological sense. The claim that both parties are relatively better comes from a financial perspective.
Regarding b); What if a third person, more efficient producing p, is able to engage in trade with A? The opportunity cost of trading with B would be way too high considering there is another person more capable of doing the same work.
Regarding c); B could choose not to engage in trade because the amount of money A is willing to pay is too low that he (B) is not able to buy food or rent a house to survive. He could then go to the jungle and try to live and produce for his own. If we were to accept Rothbard’s claims; B could even choose to steal goods and services from productive people and this would be “in line with his nature” (since he could potentially die of hunger trying to cooperate with smart people) of surviving! It becomes clear why this kind of claims (not logically derived from Action) are wrong.
Regarding d); While overall production could increase engaging in trade with B, an increase in overall production is not always good. The expected revenue or sells of A could be exactly 20p and 30p in a lapse of 60 hours. This would mean that an increase of production (and an increase of costs) would not mean a benefit at all for A. If we were talking about a good not durable (as food), the increase on production would translate to losses if the marginal production couldn’t find a client. If we were talking about a scarce high demanded good such as a signed limited edition vinyl of a really prominent artist/band, producing more than a fixed amount of units could potentially mean an overall lower aggregated income.
(13) I understand that based on our cognitive capacities, humans have more “range of choices” and more time preference, which ultimately affects (at least on Religious people) how much we act based on principles. But again, this claim is everything but praxeological. One may choose to pardon an animal or human for killing our children, but this decision is up to every individual; many things may be morally bad (drug addictions, pedophilia and, for Rothbard, even letting your children die because of starvation), but Ethics or Natural Law has nothing to do about it.
(14) Current human examples where the second spark of information is not transmitted would be the fractional reserve system, the social security system or inflation induced by central banks.
(15) Historically, the human race lived for a long time considering robbery, infanticide and killing as a good thing to survive, [due to the Malthusian Trap] but that did not mean that such acts weren’t contrary to Natural Law. It only meant that humans (or 99.9% of mankind) was in a stage where his cognitive capacity and economic means did not allow him to assimilate what was good and bad.
(16) When I wrote this article I didn't have strong opinions on the self-defense 'principle'.